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of authority, the court might properly hold that a general college education
P. J. D.
is not yet accepted as a necessary.
PRINCIPAL

AND

AGENT-AUTHORITY-CREATION

OF

RELATIONSHIP-

Samuel E. Skaggs, a bailer of, and dealer in straw, sold most but not all of
the straw he handled to the appellant company at Terre Haute. He procured straw from the appellee, Charles E. Kennedy, and shipped it to the
appellant company under an agreement with Kennedli that Skaggs should
pay him whatever amount, less $2.00 per car, the appellant paid Skaggs.
For about a month this agreement between Skaggs and Kennedy was kept;
then, after the appellant had reduced its price to Skaggs from $6.25 to
$6.00 per ton, Skaggs represented to Kennedy that the appellant was paying only $5.50 per ton for straw; and Kennedy did not learn the true price
being paid until almost a year later. He sued for the accumulated difference
between the represented and the true price, and alleged that Skaggs was
the agent of the appellant company-which allegation would, if true, make
appellant liable for the unpaid amount. Evidence showed that Skaggs sold
straw to other strawboard manufacturers, that he was not bound by any
contract to sell to the appellant all the straw he purchased, that Kennedy
had never received a check from appellant company, and that he did not
claim to have a contract with the company, other than his agreement with
Skaggs. Held, Skaggs was an independent buyer and not an agent of the
appellant. Aside from the evidence stated, no reasons were given for the
decision. Judgment against appellant, Terre Haute Paper Company, was
reversed. Terre Haute Paper Company v. Kennedy, Appellate Court, June
23, 1930, 171 N. E. 881.
"An agency is created-authority to act is actually conferred-very
much as a contract is made, i. e. by an agreement between principal and
agent that such a relation shall exist. The minds of the parties must "meet"
in establishing the agency. The principal must intend that the agent shall
act for him, and the agent must intend to accept the authority and act on
it, and the intention of the parties must find expression either in words or
in conduct between them." Taft, J. in Central Trust Co. v. Bridges, 57 Fed.
753. Appointment of an agent may be effected by contract whereby a principal promises to employ and compensate the agent, and the agent promises to act as such; or it may be effected by mere request or permission of
the principal, following by the agent's entrance upon performance of the
act requested. But if no contract is made, and if only a permission or a
request is followed, the relation of principal and agent does not arise until
the agent has entered upon performance. Powell's Tiffany on Agency (2nd
ed.) p. 10. A merely gratuitous offer to perform services for another imposes no legal obligation until performance is undertaken. Conden v. Exton-Hall Agency, 142 N. Y. S. 548.
"Authority to act as agent in any given manner will be implied whenever the conduct of the principal is such as to manifest his intention to
confer it." Powell's Tiffany on Agency, p. 23. "No one can become the agent
of another person except by the will of that other person. His will may
be manifested in writing or orally, or simply by placing another in a situation in which, according to the ordinary rules of law, or perhaps it would
be better to say according to the ordinary usages of mankind, that other
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is understood to represent and act for the person who has so placed him."
Pole v. Leask, 33 L. J. (N. S.) Ch. 155. "Agency may be irferred from
the acts, conduct, and relations of the parties, without proof of any express appointment. In fact, direct proof of agency frequently is not available, and in most of the ordinary transactions of business the agency is
either conferred verbally or is implied from the circumstances." Radio
Corporation of America v. Radio Audion Co., 284 Fed. 581. Agency may
arise by implication from acts done by an assumed agent with the consent
or acquiescence of the principal (James Bradford Co. v. Edward Hill's Son
& Co., 31 Del. 596, 116 Atl. 353); From prior habits or courses of dealing
between the parties (Bennett v. Potashnick (Mo. 1924), 257 S. W. 836);
or from apparent relations of agent and principal (Colt Co. v. Wheeler, 31
Ga. App. 427, 120 S. E. 792.)
If one has frequently employed another to do certain acts for him, or
has usually ratified such acts when done by him, such person became an
implied agent to do such acts; as, for example, a plantation manager's customary buying of supplies for the plantation, or a sawmill superintendent's
contracting for logs for the use of the mill. A single act of an assumed
agent, together with its recognition, may be so positive and comprehensive
in character as to place the authority of the agent to do similar acts for
the principal beyond question. And similar acts subsequent to the one in
question may, by being ratified, become evidence of an agency to do the
particular one in issue. Graves v. Horton, 38 Minn. 66. But the agency
implied from past acts, or from subsequent acts ratified, is limited to the
performance of like acts under like circumstances. And for an agency to
be implied from facts, the facts must be those for which the principal is
responsible; the agency must find its creation implied from acts of or in
the acquiescence of, the principal.
But it is necessary to distinguish between implied and apparent authority. Implied authority is that which the principal in fact intended the agent
to have, though the intention be implied from acts. Apparent authority is
that which, though not actually intended by the principal, he does permit
the agent to appear to have, and the appearance of which gives the agent,
if not authority from the principal, at least a power to bind him as to
third persons. Columbia Mill Co. v. Bank, 52 Minn. 224. Ostensible authority to act as agent may be conferred if the party charged as principal affirmatively, or by lack of ordinary care, causes or allows a third person to
trust and act upon such apparent agency.
From a consideration of the foregoing requisites and methods for setting up an agency relationship, one must conclude in the principal case
that neither express, implied, nor apparent agency was created; for Kennedy failed to bring the conduct or relations of the parties within the ambit of any of the described rules and situations. And one dealing with the
alleged agent has the burden of proving the agency (Oldman-Magee Boiler
Works v. Ocean & Inland Transp. Co., 205 N. Y. S. 550); the establishment of the alleged principal's liability requires proof of the authority of
the agent to bind the principal, the law indulging in no presumptions that
an agency exists (Rhodes v. Smith, (Tex. Civ. App., 1921) 230 S. W. 227.)
Since the appellant company did not have any control over the activities
of Skaggs; since it had no contract with him to take all his straw, and
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had none directly with Kennedy; since, therefore, Kennedy could have no
definite intent to pass title farther than Skaggs, and did not pags title any
farther; since Kennedy did not claim to have been dealing with a known
agent; and since the company neither had an actual contract of agency
with Skaggs nor held him out as an ostensible agent, it therefore follows
that Kennedy failed to establish Skaggs as the agent of the Terre Haute
Paper Company.
H. W. J.
PRINCIPAL AND AGENT-DISTINGUISHED FROM SIMILAR RELATIONSHIPbSThe case of Terre Haute Paper Co. v. Kennedy, 171 N. E. 881 is abstracted
in the note next preceding.
"The relation of 'agency' is a consensual relation between two persons
by virtue of which one acts for and on behalf of another and subject to
his control." Miller v. Chatsworth Savings Bank, 203 Iowa, 411, 212 N. W.
722. It i§ necessary, however, to distinguish between agency and other
relations involving the rendering of service, the acting in behalf of another, and the affecting of another's legal relations with a third person.
The function of an agent is to bring about, modify, affect, accept performance of, or terminate, contractural obligations between his principal
and a third person; the function of a servant is to render service but not
to create contractural obligations. Mechen on Agency, sec. 35.
An independent contractor is one who, exercising an independent employment, contracts to do a piece of work according to his own methods,
and without being subject to control by his employer, except as to the
result of his work. Powell v. Construction Co., 88 Tenn. 692, 13 S. W.
691. The independent contractor in the course of his work supplies his own
materials, servants, and equipment; undertakes to accomplish a certain
result; and is not subject to control or direction by his employer, but is
responsible to him for the end achieved rather than for the means used to
accomplish it. He has no authority to bind his employer in any form of
contractural dealings. So, an agreement by proprietors of a bank that a
miller should buy wheat and pay for it by checks on the bank, whose proprietors should receive flour made from the wheat, did not make the miller
their agent so as to make them liable for wheat for which he did not pay.
Witzman v. Sjoberg, 164 Minn. 411, 205 N. W. 257. And a contract whereby defendants took conveyance of land from a corporation and agreed to
furnish certain sums of money for lumbering operations, the corporation
agreeing to pay all indebtedness, was held not to create an agency relationship, not to make defendants liable for materials sold to the corporation,
and to have for its purpose merely the financing by the defendants of the
corporation's lumbering operations. Chase v. West, 121 Me. 165, 116 A.
213. Payment of a workman by the employer of the contractor does not
make the latter an agent of his employer. Miller v. Minnesota, etc. Ry.
Co., 76 Iowa 655, 39 N. W. 188. It seems, therefore, that some control of
the acts of the alleged agent in the course of his work must rest in the
principal, and some power in the so-called agent to affect legal relations
between the principal and a third person, before an agency relationship
between the alleged agent and his principal is set up.
A trust involves control of property; an agency may be totally disconnected from any particular property. The trustee holds the legal title; the

